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Abstract
We introduce a new solution concept, called periodicity, for selecting optimal
strategies in strategic form games. This periodicity solution concept yields new
insight into non-trivial games. In mixed strategy strategic form games, periodic
solutions yield values for the utility function of each player that are equal to the
Nash equilibrium ones. In contrast to the Nash strategies, here the payoffs of
each player are robust against what the opponent plays. Sometimes, periodicity
strategies yield higher utilities, and sometimes the Nash strategies do, but often
the utilities of these two strategies coincide. We formally define and study peri-
odic strategies in two player perfect information strategic form games with pure
strategies and we prove that every non-trivial finite game has at least one peri-
odic strategy, with non-trivial meaning non-degenerate payoffs. In some classes of
games where mixed strategies are used, we identify quantitative features. Partic-
ularly interesting are the implications for collective action games, since there the
collective action strategy can be incorporated in a purely non-cooperative context.
Moreover, we address the periodicity issue when the players have a continuum set
of strategies available.
1 Motivation for Periodicity and Periodic Strategies–A
non-cooperative Concept
We introduce a new concept in game theory that is an inherent characteristic of every
non-trivial, finite action-player, simultaneous, strategic form game with or without
perfect information. Here, non-trivial means non-degenerate payoffs for the players.
∗voiko@physics.auth.gr, v.k.oikonomou1979@gmail.com
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Should a game have degenerate pay-offs, it can be perturbed to one with non-degenerate
payoffs.
We shall call this new mathematical concept “periodicity” and we shall describe both
the mathematical implications and its applications in specific games.
For this periodicity concept, non-cooperativity plays an essential role. The key as-
pect is that each player tries to maximize his own payoff, by observing and predicting
which action of his opponent will make his payoff maximized. The situation is non-
cooperative as each player tries to maximize his own payoff, but there is an important
difference to standard game theory. For finding periodic strategies, each player ”scans”
his opponent’s actions, builds hierarchical belief systems on these actions, by assign-
ing corresponding probabilities and investigates which of his opponent’s strategies will
maximize his own payoffs. While this is different from standard game theory, we shall
see that it is self-consistent. Moreover, it will result in payoffs that are at least as high
as those reached by Nash type strategies.
Here is an example, which we will analyze in detail in a later section. Consider the
game named ”Test Game” appearing in the table below, which is a two player strategic
form game, played simultaneously. Player A then can use mixed strategies of the form
b1 b2
a1 2,5 50,6
a2 3,10 2,5
Table 1: Test Game
xσ = pa1 + (1− p)a2 (1)
and correspondingly for B:
yσ = qb1 + (1− q)b2. (2)
The utilities of the players are
UA(p, q) = 2pq+50p(1−q)+3(1−p)q+2(1−p)(1−q),UB (p, q) = 5pq+6p(1−q)+10(1−p)q+5(1−p)(1−q).
(3)
This game has two pure and one mixed Nash equilibrium; the latter is given by (p∗N =
5
6 , q
∗
N =
48
49 ). When B plays the Nash value q
∗
N , A’s utility
UA(p, q
∗
N = 48/49) =
146
49
(4)
is independent of his own strategy p, and likewise, when A plays p∗N , B’s utility
UB(p
∗
N = 5/6, q) =
35
6
(5)
is independent of q. We now observe that there are values (p∗p = 1/49, q
∗
p = 1/6) (with
the subscript p standing for “periodicity”), with the property that when A plays p∗p,
then his utility
UA(p
∗
p = 1/49, q) =
146
49
(6)
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now is independent of the opponent’s value q. Similarly, B’s UB(p, q
∗
p = 1/6) =
35
6 is
independent of what A does. We note that the utilities (4) and (6) agree, and the same
holds for the utilities of B.
Two insights emerge from this example. First, players can seek equilibria or stationary
values of their utility consistently w.r.t. either variable, the own action or that of
the opponent. In one case, we obtain the Nash equilibrium, where it does not matter
what one plays as long as the opponent sticks to his action. In the other case, we
obtain an equilibrium where it does not matter what the opponent does as long as a
player sticks to his own action. The latter seems better than the former. In terms
of market economics, this could be of some importance, since each player who adopts
some mixed strategy, by choosing to play such a strategy can earn the optimal payoff
(equal to Nash), without depending on the opponents actions. As we shall analyze in
more detail, this depends on optimizing not w.r.t. the own action, but w.r.t. that of
the opponent. This may seem strange, like wishful thinking, but as we shall see, when
both players consistently do that, they will do at least as well as when playing Nash.
In fact, typically, as in this example, the equilibrium utilities are the same.
More generally, we shall see that through such a process, cycles emerge, as in the
rationalizable strategies of Bernheim [7] and Pearce [8]. When trying to compute
the Nash value, a player optimizes his own strategy for any action of the opponent.
When that the process is iterated, the players will arrive at a cycle of rationalizable
strategies, and that latter class includes the Nash equilibria. Conversely, as we shall
see, for arriving at the values p∗p, q
∗
p, each player asks for that strategy of the opponent
that is best for his current action. That is, A optimizes not his own action, but that of
his opponent B. When B then takes that strategy as his starting point and computes
that response of A that is best for him, that is, B when playing that strategy, we arrive
at a new strategy of A, and the process can be repeated and iterated.
The fundamental concept in non-cooperative game theory [1–6], the Nash equilibrium,
is one of the most widely and commonly used solution concepts that predict the outcome
of a strategic interaction in the social sciences. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an
action profile with the important property that no single player can obtain a higher
payoff by deviating unilaterally from this strategy profile. Based on the rationality of
the players, a Nash strategy is a steady state of strategic interaction. In a strategic
form 2-player game with only finitely many actions, assumed to have non-degenerate
payoffs for simplicity, there may exist both pure and mixed Nash equilibria. In a pure
equilibrium, each player chooses some definite action which is the best response to
the opponent’s action, and conversely. Thus, no player can unilaterally change his
action without decreasing his payoff. In a mixed equilibrium, instead, each player has a
probability distribution for his actions which again is optimal in view of the opponent’s
distribution. A pure equilibrium can be considered as a limit case of a mixed one where
all probabilities are either 0 or 1. Mixed cases with probabilities strictly between 0 and
1 can be computed with differential calculus, by maximizing w.r.t. those probabilities,
because the payoffs depend differentiably on them (this is a standard assumption that
we shall also make implicitly).
However, as Bernheim notes in his paper [7], the Nash equilibrium is neither a necessary
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consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition. Despite the valuable
contributions that the Nash equilibrium offers to non-cooperative games, there is a
refinement, the rationalizability solution concept [10–25]. The idea of this concept is
the following. An action of a player, say A, is rationalizable if it is the best response
to some action of the opponent B. In turn, B’s action should be the best response
to some action of A, and so on. When we iterate this in a game with only finitely
many actions, then eventually, such rationalizable actions will repeat themselves, and
we obtain a periodic cycle. Our periodicity concept looks similar, with the important
difference, that a player no longer computes his own best response to an opponent’s
action, but rather seeks that opponent’s action that is best for him, given his current
action. Again, the process can be iterated, and we shall then arrive at periodic cycles.
In strategic form games, rationalizability is based on the fact that each player views
his opponent’s choices as uncertain events, each player complies to Savage’s axioms
of rationality and this fact is common knowledge [7]. The rationalizability concept
appeared independently in Bernheim’s [7] and Pearce’s work [8] (a predecessor of the
two papers was Myerson’s work [9]). Subsequently, the rationalizability solution concept
has been analyzed and refined in various games, both static and dynamic. For an
important stream of papers see [10–25] and references therein.
The Nash equilibrium and its refinements are statements about the existence of a fixed
point in every game. In this paper we shall present another mathematical property
of finite player, finite actions, simultaneous strategic form games, which we shall call
periodicity. Periodicity is a solution concept with interesting quantitative implications.
The purpose of this paper is to study periodic strategies and investigate the conse-
quences of periodicity in various cases of perfect information strategic form games. The
terms “periodic” and “periodicity” indicate that there exist self-maps Q of the players’
strategy spaces with Qn = 1 for some n ∈ N . The rationalizable strategies of Bernheim
and Pearce are also periodic in that sense. In our case, periodic strategies arise from
an optimization scheme that is different from that underlying the rationalizable ones.
2 Periodic Strategies in Strategic Form Games–Definitions–
Pure Strategies Case
2.1 Introduction to the Periodicity Concept
We restrict our present study to simultaneous, strategic form games with two players
A and B, in the context of perfect information, assuming that the game is played only
once and also that each player has only finitely many actions available. We start with
pure strategies only, before including mixed actions in a later section. The strategic
form game is then defined by:
• The strategy spaces of players A,B, denoted by M(A) = {a1, a2, a3, ..., aN} and
M(B) = {b1, b2, b3, ..., bN} (for simplicity, we shall usually assume that N = 2,
i.e., that each player has only two choices for his actions), and
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• the payoff functions Ui : M(A) ×M(B) → R, i = A,B. We shall assume, for
simplicity again, that they are non-degenerate in the sense that different actions
yield different pay-offs.
We then have the periodicity algorithm
• Start from Player A and his first action a(0). Seek that action b(1) avail-
able actions b1, b2, b3, ..., bN of B for which the corresponding payoff of player
A UA(a(0), b(1)) is maximized, that is, larger than the payoff UA(a(0), b) for any
other action b 6= b(1). (Recall that we assume non-degeneracy of payoffs, so there
is a unique such b(1).)
• For the action b(1) found in the previous step, now seek that action a(1) that
maximizes B’s payoff, that is, UB(a(1), b(1)) > UB(a, b(1)) for any other a 6= a(1).
• When iteratively actions a(k), b(k) have been chosen, seek that b(k+1) for which
UA(a(k), b(k + 1)) > UA(a(k), b) for any b 6= b(k + 1), and then that a(k + 1) for
which UB(a(k + 1), b(k + 1)) > UB(a, b(k + 1)) for any other a 6= a(k + 1).
• Continue until a(k) = a(ℓ) or b(k) = b(ℓ) for some ℓ < k.
Since at each step, by non-degeneracy, the selected action of the opponent is unique, the
procedure will then repeat itself, that is, become periodic. Hence the name “periodic
solution”.
2.2 Two Player, Perfect Information Strategic Form Games
Formalizing the preceding, we define two continuous maps between the strategy spaces,
ϕ1 :M(A)→M(B) ϕ2 :M(B)→M(A). (7)
They are defined in terms of the payoff functions by the following inequalities
UA(x, ϕ1(x)) > UA(x, y1) ∀ y1 ∈ M(B)\{ϕ1(x)} (8)
UB(ϕ2(y), y) > UB(x1, y) ∀x1 ∈ M(A)\{ϕ2(y)}.
We can achieve the strict inequalities here because we assume that the pay-off tables
are nondegenerate. Iteratively, we obtain for any positive integer k
UB((ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x), ϕ1 ◦ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k−1(x)) > UB(x1, ϕ1 ◦ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k−1(x))
∀ x1 ∈ M(A)\{(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x)}
UA((ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x), ϕ1 ◦ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x)) > UA((ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
kx, y1) (9)
∀ y1 ∈ M(B)\{ϕ1 ◦ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x)}.
Thus, in each step, a player seeks the opponent’s action that maximizes his own pay-
off given his current action. When there are only finitely many strategies available,
as we are currently assuming, then necessarily the strategies that occur in this chain
5
will repeat themselves after finitely many steps. That is, after finitely many steps, the
players turn into a periodic cycle that can be represented by the diagram
x
P
−→ ϕ1(x)
P
−→ ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1(x)
P
−→ · · ·
P
−→ x. (10)
We shall call such an action x that repeats itself after finitely many steps periodic. The
minimal number n(x) of such steps is called the periodicity number of x. We denote
the set of periodic actions of player A by P(A) and those of player B by P(B). For
periodic actions, the operator
Q = ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1 (11)
satisfies Qnx = x. In terms of the operator Q, the inequalities (9) become
UA(Q
k(x), ϕ1 ◦ Q
k(x)) > UA(Q
k(x), y1)∀ y1 ∈ M(B)\{ϕ1 ◦ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
k(x)} (12)
Likewise, for player B, we have the operator
Q′ = ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2 (13)
In this case, the inequalities (9) take the form:
UA((ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y), ϕ2 ◦ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k−1(y)) > UA(y1, ϕ2 ◦ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k−1(y)) (14)
∀ y1 ∈ M(B)\{ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y)}
UB((ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y), ϕ2 ◦ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y)) > UB((ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y), x1)
∀ x1 ∈ M(A)\{ϕ2 ◦ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
k(y)}
The last inequality can be written in terms of the operator Q′, as
UB(Q
′k(y), ϕ2 ◦ Q
′k(y)) > UB(Q
′k(y), x1) ∀ x1 ∈ M(A)\{ϕ2 ◦ Q
′k(y)} (15)
While the periodic strategies in our above sense and the rationalizable strategies are
derived from different optimization schemes, those rationalizable strategies that are
also periodic are particularly interesting. We will analyze some characteristic examples
at the end of this section. Note that the procedure described by relations (8) and (14)
does not stipulate that the maps ϕ1 and ϕ2 are best responses to some action. Take
for example the first of the inequalities (8). It means that, by assuming that player
A plays x, we seek in the action set of player B for an action ϕ1(x), for which the
utility of player A, UA(., .) is maximized. This is exactly the converse of the procedure
followed when best responses are studied. Indeed, in the best response algorithm we
don’t presuppose that player A will play some action, but we ask, given that player
B will play an action, say bk, which action of player A maximizes his utility function
UA(., .).
Let us briefly recapitulate what we just described. In the best response algorithm, we
are searching player’s A set of actions but in the periodic actions algorithm described
by the inequalities (8), we search the set of players B action, given that A plays a
specific action.
We also note that the periodicity number n depends on the payoffs rather than on the
number of available actions.
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Theorem 1. Every finite action simultaneous 2-player strategic form game contains
at least one periodic action.
Proof. Since there are only finitely many actions, starting with any action x∗ of A and
iteratively applying the operator Q will eventually lead to some x that has already
occurred before in the chain, that is, Qn(x) = x. But then, because Q is defined by
the inequalities (8), Qn+k(x) = Qkx for every positive integer k, and x is periodic.
This reasoning reveals another property of the set of periodic actions in finite action
games. We modify the definition of set stability from Bernheim [7] as follows:
Definition 1 (Set Stability). Consider an automorphism Q : M(A) → M(A). In
addition, let A ⊆ A ∪ B ⊆ M(A), with A ∩ B = ∅. The set A is set stable under
the action of the map Q if, for any initial x0 ∈ A ∪ B and any sequence xk formed
by taking xk+1 ∈ Q(xk), there exists xK ∈ A ∪ B such that d(xK , x
1) < ǫ, with x1
∈ A. For finite sets, this implies that any sequence formed by the act of the operator
Q on elements produces an element xk for any initial x0, with xk belonging to the set
stable set A. An analogous definition applies for the set of actions of player B and the
operator Q′ :M(B)→M(B).
Theorem 2. Let P(A) and P(B) denote the set of periodic strategies for players A
and B. The sets P(A) and P(B) are set stable, under the action of the maps Q and Q′
respectively.
The theorem says that for any non-periodic action x0, we eventually arrive in the
periodicity cycle of some action xK , that is:
x0
P
−→ Q(x0)
P
−→ Q2(x0)
P
−→ · · · xK
P
−→ QxK
P
−→ · · ·
P
−→ Qn−1xK
P
−→ xK (16)
Proof. The proof of this theorem is contained in the proof of Theorem 1, so we omit
it.
Finally, let us present two versions of the algorithm for finding periodic strategies. Here,
we do not assume that the payoff table is non-degenerate. The first compact form of
the algorithm is the following:
Algorithm 1. Consider a finite action simultaneous 2-player strategic form game. We
find periodic solutions according to the following algorithm.
Start with any actions ξ0 ∈ M(A), η0 ∈ M(B) of A and B.
Given ξk, ηk for k ≥ 0, determine ηk+1 ∈ M(B) such that
UA(ξk, ηk+1) ≥ UA(ξk, y) ∀y ∈ M(B). (17)
Given ξk, ηk+1, determine ξk+1 ∈ M(A) such that
UB(ξk+1, ηk+1) ≥ UB(x, ηk+1) ∀x ∈ M(A). (18)
Repeat with k + 1 in place of k.
Stop with step n when ξn = ξℓ or ηn = ηℓ for some ℓ < n.
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Here is a more detailed description of the algorithm:
• Start from Player A and his first action a1. Seek in the strategy space of B, that
is in the discrete set of all the available actions of B, namely b1, b2, b3, ..., bN , and
find the action bj for which, the corresponding payoff of player A UA(a1, bj) is
maximized, that is, the payoff UA(a1, bj) is the largest among all payoffs UA(a1, bi),
with i = 1, 2, 3, ...j − 1, ...j + 1, ...N . So with the procedure we just described we
have the chain of actions a1 → bj for the moment. Note that this looks like a
map from the strategy space of player A to the strategy space of player B, and
in fact, this describes the formal iteration step underlying periodicity.
• For the action bj found in the previous step, now seek that action of player A,
among the available actions a1, a2, a3, ..., aN , for which the payoff UB(ai, bj) of
player B for the action bj is maximized. Suppose this occurs for the action ak.
So the chain of actions now becomes a1 → bj → ak.
• For the action ak found in the previous step, now seek that action of player B,
among the available actions b1, b2, b3, ..., bN , for which the payoff UA(ak, bi) of
player A for the action ak is maximized. Suppose this occurs for the action bm.
So the chain of actions now becomes a1 → bj → ak → bm.
• ....
• ....
• The above procedure is repeated, alternating between A and B. Once one of the
previous selected actions reoccurs, say a0, then this action a0 is characterized as a
periodic action, and the final chain of actions is a0 → bj → ak → bm → .... → a1
(with bj now being the response to a0, etc.). The corresponding actions of player
B then are also periodic.
• Once such a periodic action and the correponding chain have been found, the
algorithm comes to an end.
• The same procedure can be adopted for all the actions of player A and B.
2.3 Periodic Nash and Rationalizable Strategies
We are interested in those Nash strategies that are at the same time periodic actions.
Suppose that the strategy set (x∗, y∗) constitutes one of the Nash equilibria of a two
player finite action simultaneous move game. Then the actions (x∗, y∗) are mutually
best responses for the two players. In order for a Nash strategy to be a periodic strategy,
the following conditions must hold true.
Theorem 3. In a 2-player finite action, simultaneous, strategic form game, a Nash
strategy (x∗, y∗) of a game is periodic if
ϕ1(x
∗) = y∗ (19)
ϕ2(y
∗) = x∗
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with ϕ1,ϕ2 defined in such a way that the inequalities (8), (14) hold true. In addition,
the periodicity number for each action is equal to one, that is n = 1 and,
Q(x∗) = x∗ (20)
Q′(y∗) = y∗
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is simple, but we must bear in mind that the maps
ϕ1,2 do not yield in general the best response sets of the players involved in a game.
Suppose that for the Nash strategy (x∗, y∗), the relations (19) hold true. Acting on the
first with the map ϕ2, and with ϕ1 on the second relation, we obtain the relations:
ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1(x
∗) = ϕ2(y
∗) (21)
ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2(y
∗) = ϕ1(x
∗)
Using relations (19), the equations (21) become:
φ2 ◦ φ1(x
∗) = x∗ (22)
φ1 ◦ φ2(y
∗) = y∗
Hence, the Nash actions (x∗, y∗) are periodic. The relations (22) can be cast in terms
of the operators Q and Q′ as
Q(x∗) = x∗ (23)
Q′(y∗) = y∗
It is obvious that the periodicity number for the two actions is n = 1.
Similarly, also rationalizable strategies can be periodic. This is the case if the ratio-
nalizability chain is identical to the periodicity cycle. In particular, this is the case
if the rationalizability chains of belief contain actions that satisfy at every step the
inequalities (8) and (14).
2.4 Examples
2.4.1 Games with and without Periodic Nash Equilibria-Four Choices two
Player Games
We start with Game 1A in Table 2, which is an analogue of one of the games in [7].
We shall focus on the choices of player A , but similar results hold for B’s actions.
Using the algorithm that the inequalities of relation (8) dictate, we can construct the
periodicity cycles
a1
P
−→ b3
P
−→ a3
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a1 (24)
a3
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a1
P
−→ b3
P
−→ a3
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b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1
a2 5,2 3,3 5,2 0,1
a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1
a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1
Table 2: Game 1A
The periodicity number is n = 2 for both actions, a1 and a3. For the actions that
constitute a Nash equilibrium, it is not possible to construct such a cycle. Nevertheless,
if we apply the algorithm (8), we obtain the following cycle:
a2
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a1
P
−→ b3
P
−→ a3
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a1 (25)
It is obvious that the cycle of the non-periodic Nash action a2 merges into the periodic
cycle of the periodic action a1, as predicted by Theorem 2. We next consider the
rationalizability cycles. The actions a1 and a3 are both rationalizable. and periodic, and
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1
a2 5,2 7,7 5,2 0,1
a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1
a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1
Table 3: Game 1B
the rationalizability cycles coincide with the periodicity cycles. Here, a rationalizability
cycle is a cycle based on rationality, that is, acting optimally under some beliefs about
the opponents actions. Indeed, such a cycle looks like:
a1
R
−→ b3
R
−→ a3
R
−→ b1
R
−→ a1 (26)
a3
R
−→ b1
R
−→ a1
R
−→ b3
R
−→ a3
The reasoning behind this cycle is based on this system of beliefs: Player A considers
action a1 rational if he believes that player B will play b3, which is rational for player
B if he believes that player A will play a3. Accordingly, A will consider playing a3
rational if he believes that player B will play b1, which would be rational for player B if
he believes that player A will play a1. Therefore, we obtain a cycle of rationalizability
based on pure utility maximization rationality.
The Nash action a2 is not contained in such a cycle due to the fact that A will be forced
to play a2, and B would never play b1 or b3 as a best response to a2. So, the Nash
strategy is “forced“ to be rationalizable. In this game, the non-Nash rationalizable
actions are periodic actions which actually are the only periodic strategies and also the
rationality cycles and periodicity cycles coincide.
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We now slightly modify Game 1A and consider Game 1B in Table 3. The difference is
that the Nash equilibrium payoffs are changed. In this case, the periodicity cycles of
the actions a1 and a3 remain intact, but in this case, the Nash action a2 is also periodic,
with periodicity cycle:
a2
R
−→ b2
R
−→ a2 (27)
Again, the periodicity and rationalizability cycles for the Nash action a2 coincide.
2.4.2 2× 2 Games
Now we analyze 2 × 2 simultaneous strategic form games. Consider first Game 2 in
Table 4. The Nash equilibrium consists of the actions (a2, b2). Following the reasoning
b1 b2
a1 3,5 0,2
a2 4,3 5,4
Table 4: Game 2
of relation (8), we can construct the following periodicity cycles:
a1
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a1 (28)
a2
P
−→ b2
P
−→ a2
Obviously, all actions have a periodicity cycle and additionally all the periodicity num-
bers are equal to one in this particular game. Note that the actions that enter the
Nash equilibrium are also periodic. However, the action a1 is strictly dominated by the
action a2 for all cases, so it is not rationalizable. So we can never construct a cycle
based on rationality argument for this action. Indeed, player A would never consider
the action a1 to be a rational move, since it can never be a best response.
Nevertheless, we can construct a cycle based on rationality arguments for the a2 action.
Indeed, player A would consider a2 to be a rational move if he believed that player B
would play b2, which would be rational for player B if he believes that player A plays
a2. According to this line of reasoning we can construct the following rationalizability
cycle,
a2
R
−→ b2
R
−→ a2. (29)
In this particular game, the set of periodic actions for player A consists of both actions
a1 and a2, that is P(A) = {a1, a2}, while the set of rationalizable actions that are not
Nash actions is empty. The set of Nash actions consists of the action {a2}. For this
particular game, the Nash equilibrium happens to be periodic.
In this game, the iterated elimination of dominated strategies results in (a2, b2) which
is the Nash equilibrium. This class of games describes competition between two firms
11
that choose quantities that they produce, knowing that the total quantity that is made
available in the market actually determines the price [26]. In this game, a periodic Nash
equilibrium is the only action that remains after the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies.
2.4.3 Some Standard Games
Before closing this section, we study the periodicity properties of the players available
actions for the prisoner’s dilemma game, the battle of sexes game and finally the match-
ing pennies game. Let us start with the prisoner’s dilemma game, Game 3 in Table 5,
with a < b < c < d. The action a1 is rationalizable but not periodic. The action a2
b1 b2
a1 b,b d,a
a2 a,d c,c
Table 5: Game 3, Prisoner’s Dilemma
is periodic and the strategy (a2, b2) contains periodic actions. Actually, the periodicity
cycle in this case is
a2
P
−→ b2
P
−→ a1
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a2 (30)
Note that the periodicity number is n = 2 in this case.
Let us continue with the Battle of Sexes, Game 4 in Table 6. There are two Nash equi-
b1 b2
a1 2,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,2
Table 6: Game 4, Battle of Sexes
libria, (a1, b1) and (a2, b2), and both actions a1 and a2 are periodic and rationalizable.
There are no non-Nash strategies that are rationalizable. In this game, we always have
n = 1.
Finally, in the matching pennies game, Game 5 in Table 7. we have n = 2 and the ac-
b1 b2
a1 1,-1 -1,1
a2 -1,1 1,-1
Table 7: Game 5, The Matching Pennies Game
tions a1, a2 are both periodic and rationalizable, that is, we can construct the following
cycles:
a1
P
−→ b1
P
−→ a2
P
−→ b2
P
−→ a1 (31)
a2
R
−→ b2
R
−→ a1
R
−→ b1
R
−→ a2
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All the actions of both players are periodic and rationalizable. There is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. This motivates to turn to mixed strategies. This will be the subject
of the next section.
Before closing this section, let us briefly comment on the case of extensive form games
and periodicity. Since every perfect information extensive form game has a strategic
form game representation, all arguments apply to extensive form games. The difference
is that the strategic form representation of an extensive form game has many degenera-
cies, so we may have many periodicity cycles corresponding to a specific action. Here,
however, this will not be analyzed further.
3 Periodicity, Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in
Finite Action Simultaneous Strategic Form Games
3.1 Essential Features of Periodicity in the Case of Mixed Strategies:
Introductory Remarks
We shall now develop the periodicity concept for mixed strategies for finite action
simultaneous strategic form games (again for 2-player games only), and derive its con-
sequences. For some classes of well-known games, the periodic mixed strategies yield
the same payoff as the Nash strategies do. Sometimes, they yield even higher payoffs.
The important difference, or advantage of such periodic strategies is that, in contrast
to the situation for Nash equilibria, the payoff of a player does not depend on the ac-
tion of the opponent. For Nash, the underlying rationality assumption is crucial. Each
player is not only rational himself, but assumes that the opponent is rational as well,
in the sense that he adopts the best response to the own action. An equilibrium where
both act rationally in that sense is a Nash equilibrium. For the periodicity concept, in
contrast, one assumes that the opponent chooses the best action not for himself, but for
oneself. As we shall see, this is as self-consistent as the Nash rationality assumption.
Let us now present the essential idea of the algorithm for mixed strategies, again for
simultaneous mixed strategy, two-player, strategic form games with perfect information.
And for simplicity, we grant each player two actions only.
A general mixed strategy for the player A then is of the form
xσ = pa1 + (1− p)a2, (32)
and one for B looks like
yσ = qb1 + (1− q)b2. (33)
The crucial parameters here are the probabilities 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. We assume that the pay-
offs depend differentiably on them. In fact, in game theory, it is usually assumed that
the payoff for a mixed strategy is the convex combination of those for pure strategies,
that is,
Ui(p, q) = pqUi(a1, b1)+(1−p)qUi(a2, b1)+p(1−q)Ui(a1, b2)+(1−p)(1−q)Ui(a2, b2) for i = A,B.
(34)
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The difference between periodic and Nash mixed strategies then reduces to the fact that
for Nash, a player, say A, optimizes w.r.t. his own action and therefore, UA(p, q) has
to be differentiated w.r.t. to his own probability p to find the optimum. In contrast,
for the periodic strategy, A will need to differentiate UA(p, q) w.r.t. the opponent’s
probability q. Since p and q enter linearly in (34), when we differentiate w.r.t. p and
put the resulting expression = 0 to find the extremum, the result will only depend on
q and not on p. That is, for Nash, the result is independent of the own action and only
depends on the opponent’s choice of q. In contrast, when we differentiate w.r.t. q and
set the result = 0, it will no longer depend on the opponent’s q, but only on the own p.
We can thus turn the procedure into algorithmic form by iteratively performing such
an optimization for the 2 players in turn. We work with the set-up defined in the
beginning of this section, in particular the utility functions (34).
• Start with some value of p for player A and put ∂UA(p,q)
∂q
= 0. The solution specifies
a mixed strategy action p∗p (with the subscript p standing for “periodic”.)
• Continue with some value q for player B and put ∂UB(p,q)
∂p
= 0, leading to a mixed
strategy action q∗p.
• Check for both players if the following conditions hold true:
∂UA(p, q)
∂q
∣∣∣
p=p∗p
= 0 (35)
UAp∗p,q = max
(
UA(p, q)
)
, ∀ p, q
∂UB(p, q)
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q∗p
= 0 (36)
UB(p, q
∗
p) = max
(
UB(p, q)
)
, ∀ p, q
• Check if q∗p is the only value of q that maximizes UA(p
∗
p, q) and also check if p
∗
p is
the only value of p that maximizes UB(p, q
∗
p).
• If so, stop; otherwise return to the beginning.
When the algorithm stops, we have found p∗p and q
∗
p which are mutually optimal. That
means that q∗p is that action of B that is optimal for A when he plays p
∗
p, and conversely.
3.2 Periodicity for Mixed Strategies
We now look for periodicity patterns in 2× 2 games in the context of mixed strategies.
As in the pure strategy case, this periodicity will be materialized by two maps Φ1, Φ2
that constitute the automorphisms Q = Φ2 ◦Φ1 and Q
′ = Φ1 ◦Φ2. Their definition will
be different from the pure strategy case. Take for example player A: The operator Q
has the property that there exists a positive integer n and some action xσ ∈ ∆(M(A)),
for which Qnxσ = xσ. The actions of the maps Φ1 and Φ2 are defined in the mixed
strategies case as follows,
Φ1 : ∆(M(A))→ ∆(M(B)) (37)
Φ2 : ∆(M(B))→ ∆(M(A))
where M(A) and M(B) are the available strategies space of player A and B, and
∆(M(A)) and ∆(M(B)) are the probability distributions over the corresponding strat-
egy spaces. These two maps Φ1 and Φ2 are defined such that we have for all k ≥ 1
UBp,q((Φ2 ◦ Φ1)
k(xσ),Φ1 ◦ (Φ2 ◦ Φ1)
k−1(xσ)) > UBp,q(xσ1 ,Φ1 ◦ (Φ2 ◦ Φ1)
k−1(xσ))
∀ xσ1 ∈ ∆(M(A)\{(Φ2 ◦Φ1)
k(xσ)})
UAp,q((Φ2 ◦Φ1)
k(xσ),Φ1 ◦ (Φ2 ◦ Φ1)
k(xσ)) > UAp,q((Φ2 ◦ Φ1)
kxσ, yσ1)
∀ yσ1 ∈ ∆(M(B)\{Φ1 ◦ (Φ2 ◦Φ1)
k(xσ)}) (38)
when we consider player A. The algorithm implied by the inequalities (38) dictates
that starting with a mixed strategy of player A, namely xσ, and upon which we act
with the map Φ1, we search in player’s B set of probability distributions ∆(M(B)), in
order to find which mixed strategy maximizes the expected utility of player A. This
then is iterated. Accordingly, just like in the pure strategy case, it is possible that the
process returns to the initial mixed strategy, xσ. In that case, there is a chain of mixed
strategies of the following form:
xσ
P
−→ Φ1(xσ)
P
−→ Φ2 ◦ Φ1(xσ)
P
−→ · · ·
P
−→ xσ (39)
where as in the pure strategy case, the letter P denotes the procedure described in
relation (38) above. A mixed strategies for which we can find such a chain, is called
periodic, and as in the pure strategy case, such strategies satisfy
Qnxσ = xσ (40)
The last inequality of (38) then becomes
UAp,q(Q
n(xσ),Φ1 ◦ Q
n(xσ)) > UAp,q(Q
n(xσ), yσ1)∀ yσ1 ∈ ∆
(
M(B)\{Φ1 ◦ Q
n(xσ)})
)
(41)
Dealing with mixed strategies provides the advantage that we can use differential calcu-
lus to identify the optimizers at each step. The action of the map Φ1 on xσ is equivalent
to the maximization of UAp,q with respect to q. Indeed, take for example the initial
inequality of relation (38). The map Φ1 yields a strategy ∈ ∆(N(B)) by which the
expected utility of player A is maximized. Hence, if we differentiate UAp,q with respect
to q, the corresponding solution p∗p is equal to Φ1(xσ),
p∗p = Φ1(xσ) (42)
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We shall use the property implied by relation (42) in one of the next subsections to
bring out interesting features in some classes of games. The same considerations apply
for player B. Thereby, the corresponding inequalities (38) for a given initial mixed
strategy yσ ∈ ∆(M(A)), now become
UAp,q((Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k(yσ),Φ2 ◦ (Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k−1(yσ)) > UAp,q(yσ1 ,Φ2 ◦ (Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k−1(yσ)) (43)
∀ yσ1 ∈ ∆(M(B))\{Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k(yσ)}
UBp,q ((Φ1 ◦Φ2)
k(yσ),Φ2 ◦ (Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k(yσ)) > UBp,q((Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k(yσ), xσ1)
∀ xσ1 ∈ ∆(M(A))\{Φ2 ◦ (Φ1 ◦ Φ2)
k(yσ)}
for every k ≥ 1. The inequality at the periodic value k = n can be written in terms of
the operator Q′ as
UBp,q (Q
′n(y),Φ2 ◦ Q
′n(y)) > UBp,q (Q
′n(y), xσ1)∀ xσ1 ∈ M(A) (44)
where the operator Q′ is given by
Q′ = Φ1 ◦ Φ2. (45)
Hence, a periodic action yσ of player B satisfies
Q′
n
yσ = yσ (46)
We shall now discuss some standard strategic form games for which the periodicity
argument applies.
3.3 Periodic Mixed Strategies in Some Games
To see which games have the properties discussed in the previous sections, we look at
general characteristics of the payoff matrix. The maximization of A’s utility function
UAp,q with respect to q yields
p∗p =
UAp,q(a2, b2)− UAp,q(a2, b1)
(UAp,q(a1, b1) + UAp,q(a2, b2)− UAp,q(a1, b2)− UAp,q(a2, b1))
(47)
while the maximization with respect to p yields
q∗N =
UA(a2, b2)− UA(a1, b2)
(UA(a1, b1) + UA(a2, b2)− UA(a1, b2)− UA(a2, b1))
. (48)
The relation (47) yields the potential mixed periodic strategy, while relation (48) yields
the potential Nash mixed strategy.
Now, we will exploit the fact that when the opponent plays a mixed Nash equilibrium
strategy, the player’s expected utility is independent of his own randomization over his
own strategies, and at the same time, the utility is maximized. For example, in the
case of player A, this would mean that the corresponding Nash equilibrium does not
depend on p but on q. Hence, we can built games in such a way that the mixed periodic
strategies are related to the mixed Nash equilibria and then explore the consequences
of such a relation.
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3.3.1 First Type of Games
We take a look at 2× 2 games that satisfy
p∗p = q
∗
N (49)
q∗p = p
∗
N
where p∗p and p
∗
N are the mixed periodic and mixed Nash equilibria for player A and
q∗p and q
∗
N are those for player B. Hence, it is obvious how the robustness of the corre-
sponding expected utilities is achieved. Making use of relations (48) and (47), relations
(49) impose some restrictions on the payoff matrices, which are the following,
UAp,q(a1, b2) = UAp,q(a2, b1), UBp,q(a1, b2) = UBp,q(a2, b1) (50)
Let us illustrate this result for the Battle of Sexes in Table 8. The mixed Nash equilib-
b1 b2
a1 2,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,2
Table 8: Mixed Strategies Game 1
rium for this game is (p∗N =
2
3 , q
∗
N =
1
3). If we maximize A’s expected utility w.r.t. q,
we obtain
∂UAp,q
∂q
= −1 + 3p, hence the mixed periodic strategy is p∗p = 1/3, and again,
this is independent of the value of q. The corresponding maximization procedure for
player B yields the mixed periodic strategy q∗p = 2/3. Let us now examine the expected
utilities of the players. The expected utility for player A for the mixed ”periodic” (we
shall use the term periodic even though these strategies are not periodic per se, but
these strategies result from using the first three steps of the mixed strategies algorithm
we described in the previous sections) strategy p∗p = 1/3 is
UAp,q(p
∗
p = 1/3, q) =
2
3
(51)
and is independent of q. By symmetry, the same applies for players B utility for
q∗p = 2/3:
UBp,q(p, q
∗
p = 2/3) =
2
3
. (52)
The expected utilities of the players when the opponent plays his mixed Nash strategy
p∗N = q
∗
N = 1/3 are
UAp,q(p, q
∗
N = 1/3) = UBp,q(p
∗
N = 2/3, q) =
2
3
, (53)
and these values do not depend on the own action, and the expected utilities are maxi-
mized when the opponent plays mixed Nash. Also notice that the expected utilities for
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the mixed periodic strategy take also theirmaximum values. The utilities corresponding
to the periodic strategies and to the mixed Nash equilibria coincide.
The disadvantage of the mixed Nash strategy, compared to the mixed periodic strategy,
is that in order for the expected utility to be maximized, the opponent has to play Nash.
This renders all the strategies of the player optimal. However, this does not happen
in the periodic mixed strategy case, where when a player plays his own periodic mixed
strategy, the expected utility is maximized, regardless of what the other player plays.
We observe furthermore that if player A plays his own Nash mixed strategy p∗N = 2/3,
his expected utility is
UAp,q(p
∗
N = 2/3, q) =
1
3
+ q. (54)
Accordingly the expected utility of player B for q∗N = 1/3 is
UBp,q(p, q
∗
N = 1/3) =
4
3
− p (55)
These utilities depend on what the other player plays, and thus the mixed strategies
of each player do not render the corresponding payoff robust against the opponent’s
strategies.
In contrast, the mixed periodic strategies render the corresponding payoffs robust to
what the opponent chooses, and in addition these maximize the expected utility func-
tions. This result is very intriguing, since the mixed periodic strategies we found,
namely (p∗p = 1/3, q
∗
p = 2/3) are not rationalizable actions. Nevertheless, we have seen
that the player who adopts these strategies always achieves equal or larger payoff in
comparison to the mixed Nash payoff, regardless of what his opponent eventually plays
(we assume here 0 < p, q < 1).
3.3.2 Second Type of Games
We now turn to games that satisfy
p∗p = 1− q
∗
N (56)
q∗p = 1− p
∗
N .
These conditions render the corresponding expected utilities robust against the oppo-
nent strategies. In addition, condition (56) implies
UAp,q(a1, b1) = UAp,q(a2, b2), UBp,q(a1, b1) = UBp,q(a2, b2) (57)
Let us illustrate this result for Game 2 in Table 9. We have two pure Nash equilibria,
(a1, b2) and (a2, b1), which at the same time are periodic, and the mixed Nash equilib-
rium (p∗N =
5
6 , q
∗
N =
48
49). The mixed periodic strategy of A is p
∗
p = 1/49 according to
(56), and that for B is q∗p = 1/6. The expected utility for player A at p
∗
p = 1/49 is
UAp,q(p
∗
p = 1/49, q) =
146
49
(58)
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b1 b2
a1 2,5 50,6
a2 3,10 2,5
Table 9: Mixed Strategies Game 2
which is again independent of q. Similarly, that of B for q∗p = 1/6 is
UBp,q(p, q
∗
p = 1/6) =
35
6
. (59)
Again, these coincide with the expected utilities resulting from playing Nash,
UAp,q(p, q
∗
N = 48/49) =
146
49
, UBp,q(p
∗
N = 5/6, q) =
35
6
. (60)
Again, the mixed Nash payoffs are independent of the own action and the expected
utilities are maximized when the opponent plays his mixed Nash strategy. And again,
the expected utilities for the mixed periodic strategy take their maximum values, which
are equal to the ones obtained for the Nash strategies. However, if player A plays for
instance his own Nash mixed strategy p∗N = 5/6, his expected utility is
UAp,q(p
∗
N = 5/6, q) = −
239
6
q + 42 (61)
while the expected utility for player B, when he plays q∗N = 48/49, is
UBp,q(p, q
∗
N = 1/3) =
485 − 239p
49
(62)
Again, these utilities depend on what the opponent plays, in contrast to the mixed
periodic strategies. And again, the two types of utilities coincide.
As a general remark for the types of games appearing in Tables 8 and 9, we should
note that Ui(pp, qp) = Ui(pN , qN ), whenever both the Nash and the periodicity solution
concepts require a mixed strategy. This can also be seen by looking Eqs. (58), (59)
and (60).
Since in game theory, one is often more interested in pure than in mixed solutions,
we now look at another game in Table 10, For this game, by applying the periodicity
b1 b2
a1 4,0 -1,-1
a2 -3,1 0,4
Table 10: Alternative Example
algorithm, we find that the mixed periodic payoffs are
UAp,q(p
∗
p = 1/2, q
∗
p = 1/2) =
1
2
, UBp,q(p
∗
p = 1/2, q
∗
p = 1/2) =
3
2
, (63)
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and the corresponding mixed Nash payoffs are
UAp,q(p
∗
N = 1/2, q
∗
N = 1/2) =
1
2
, UBp,q(p
∗
N = 1/2, q
∗
N = 1/2) =
3
2
, (64)
so the two solution concepts yield the same mixed payoffs. However, the pure Nash
equilibrium is (a2, b2), so the player B gets a higher payoff for the pure Nash strategy.
The same would apply for player A if we transposed the payoffs. Therefore, sometimes
periodicity is better, while at other times Nash is better. This seems to be a generic
characterization which covers more types of games, compared with the first and second
type games discussed earlier in this section.
We now turn to games where the expected periodic utilities are actually higher than
those from mixed Nash.
3.3.3 When Periodicity is Better than Nash Mixed Strategies: The Case
of Collective Action Games and Prisoner Dilemma Type of Games
In this section, we shall treat a class of games that includes the “Pure Public Good”
games. Let us recall an example. Suppose that two oil companies want to extract
oil near some island and transfer it to international markets. For that, a pipeline is
needed The government’s public policy allows only one pipeline, so both companies
must share the pipeline, when it is constructed. Both companies will benefit from it,
but the question is who is going to fund the construction of this pipeline.
Such games are inherent to problems of collective action [26]. In this kind of games,
the actions that yield better payoffs for the players do not belong to the set of best
private interest actions of the players, or more formally, the Pareto optimal outcome is
not necessarily the Nash equilibrium.
The pipeline project, like any Pure Public Good game, has two characteristic properties
that the benefits are non excludable and non-rival. Such a game can be represented in
matrix form in Game 3 in Table 11 (taken from [26]). The Nash equilibrium is (a2, b2).
b1 b2
a1 4,4 -1,6
a2 6,-1 0,0
Table 11: Mixed Strategies Game 3
The payoffs depend on the quality and the time that it takes to materialize the project.
Obviously, the optimal action for both players is not to participate, no matter what
the other player does, that is, to act as a “free rider”. In contrast, the Pareto optimum
is achieved when the strategy (a1, b1) is adopted by both players.
The social optimal is always achieved when the total sum of the players payoffs is
maximized, but this requires a cooperative way of thinking. Using mixed periodic
strategies, we now want to analyze the game within a non-cooperative perspective.
Let us analyze the mixed strategies that this game has. There is no mixed Nash
equilibrium, but only the pure Nash strategy (a2, b2). The expected utilities of the two
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players for p = p∗N = 0, and q = q
∗
N = 0 are both
UAp,q(p
∗
N = 0, q
∗
N = 0) = UBp,q(p
∗
N = 0, q
∗
N = 0) = 0. (65)
For identifying mixed periodic strategies, we maximize the expected utility of player
A with respect to q and that of player B with respect to p. This results in the pure
strategies p∗p = 1 and q
∗
p = 1. The expected utilities of both players are maximized for
this periodic strategy,
UAp,q(p
∗
p = 1, q
∗
p = 1) = UBp,q(p
∗
p = 1, q
∗
p = 1) = 4 (66)
Hence, in this case, the social optimum strategy is realized by periodic strategies,
although we have used a non-cooperative method in terms of a self-maximization pro-
cedure for each player. The fact that the two outcomes, that is, non-cooperative and
cooperative ones, coincide depends on the particular details of this game. But the
important insight is that the non-cooperative optimization procedure underlying the
periodic strategies yields a higher payoff than the Nash strategies.
We will further analyze this type of games, by exploiting another example, Game 4
in Table 12, which again is a collective action game. The mixed Nash equilibrium is
b1 b2
a1 0,0 6,1
a2 1,6 3,3
Table 12: Mixed Strategies Game 4
p∗N =
3
4 , q
∗
N =
3
4 . If we maximize A’s expected utility subject to q we get
∂UA
∂q
= −2 < 0
∀ q. Hence, the expected utility is maximized when q = q∗p = 0, since the utility is
monotonically decreasing with respect to q. Correspondingly, maximizing B’s expected
utility with respect to p we get ∂UB
∂p
= −2 < 0 ∀ p, and B’s expected utility is maximized
when p∗p = 0. Therefore, the periodic strategies are p
∗
p = 0, q
∗
p = 0. For the periodic
strategies, UBp,q(p
∗
p = 0, q
∗
p = 0) = 3 and UAp,q(p
∗
p = 0, q
∗
p = 0) = 3 while for the Nash
strategies we get UAp,q(q
∗
N = 3/4, p
∗
N = 3/4) = 2.25 and UBp,q(q
∗
N = 3/4, p
∗
N = 3/4) =
2.25.
Hence, the periodic strategy, which is pure in this game, again yields higher payoffs for
both players than the Nash strategy.
In conclusion, this provides a possible solution to the question why the players should
play socially optimal strategies, instead of individually optimal ones, through a strictly
non-cooperative scheme.
4 Two-player Simultaneous Strategic Form Games with a
Continuum Set of Strategies
In this section, we shall study the implications of the periodic strategies algorithm
for the case of two player games with continuous strategies for the players. We shall
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consider strategic form, simultaneous, symmetric games with quadratic payoffs. Many
examples from the economics literature belong to this class of games, such as the
Cournot and Bertrand duopoly, provision of public good and search games [27]. while
the periodic strategies algorithm does not yield as interesting results as in the collective
action games, we shall nevertheless present it in order to explore possible applications
of the algorithm.
We consider a game with two players I = 1, 2, for which a continuum set of strategies
is available for each player and where the payoffs are of the following form:
u1(x, y) = a1x+ a2y + a3xy + a4x
2 + a5y
2 (67)
u2(x, y) = b1x+ b2y + b3xy + b4x
2 + b5y
2
where x, y ∈ R+. In both cases, the parameters a5, b5 are assumed to be negative, to
make the payoffs concave in the own strategy. For simplicity, we assume that the game
is symmetric, that is ai = bi for all i. For the Nash equilibria, the following equations
must be solved simultaneously :
∂u1
∂x
= 0,
∂u2
∂y
= 0. (68)
For the periodic strategies, we have to solve simultaneously:
∂u1
∂y
= 0,
∂u2
∂x
= 0. (69)
In order for the critical points (xN , yN ) of equations (68) to be maxima, the following
two conditions have to be satisfied:
D1 =
∂2u1
∂x2
∂2u1
∂y2
−
∂2u1
∂y∂x
> 0,
∂2u1
∂x2
|xN ,yN < 0
D2 =
∂2u2
∂x2
∂2u2
∂y2
−
∂2u2
∂y∂x
> 0,
∂2u2
∂x2
|xN ,yN < 0. (70)
In the case of general quadratic games, the above conditions become:
D1 = −a
2
3 + 4a4a5 > 0, a4 < 0 (71)
D2 = −b
2
3 + 4b4b5 > 0, b4 < 0
The conditions for maxima of the periodic strategies algorithm are
D1 = −a
2
3 + 4a4a5 > 0, a5 < 0 (72)
D2 = −b
2
3 + 4b4b5 > 0, b5 < 0.
For symmetric games, the conditions simplify:
D1 = −a
2
3 + 4a4a5 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0. (73)
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These last conditions are satisfied for all quadratic games that satisfy the convexity
condition imposed above. The Nash equilibria and the “periodic” points are:
x = −
−2a1b5 − a3b2
−a3b3 + 4a4b5
, y = −
−2a4b2 − a1b3
−a3b3 + 4a4b5
, Nash (74)
x = −
−2a5b1 + a2b3
a3b3 − 4a5b4
, y = −
a3b1 − 2a2b4
a3b3 − 4a5b4
, Periodic
We shall now consider two examples of continuous, symmetric quadratic games, the
“Cournot Duopoly” game and the “Provision of Public Good” game.
4.1 Cournot Duopoly
The Cournot duopoly quadratic game has the form
u1(x, y) = (P −A(x+ y))x− (Bx−Mx
2), (75)
u2(x, y) = (P −A(x+ y))y − (By −My
2)
Thus, in (67) (with ai = bi), we put
a1 = P −B, a3 = −A, a4 = −A+M, a2 = a5 = 0. (76)
The Nash equilibrium is obtained by putting ∂u1
∂x
= 0 = ∂u2
∂y
, resulting in
x∗N = y
∗
N =
P −B
3A− 2M
(77)
and the corresponding utilities are:
u1(x
∗
N , y
∗
N ) = u2(x
∗
N , y
∗
N ) =
(P −B)2(A−M)
(3A− 2M)2
. (78)
In contrast, for the periodic equilibrium, we need ∂u2
∂x
= 0 = ∂u1
∂y
, resulting in
x∗p = y
∗
p = 0 and u1(x
∗
p, y
∗
p) = u2(x
∗
p, y
∗
p) = 0. (79)
Thus, if A > M , the Nash equilibrium results in higher utilities for the players. This
game, however, is degenerate in the sense that when computing the periodic optimum
for A by putting 0 = ∂u2
∂x
= −Ax, this does not determine the optimal value of the
opponent’s strategy y. In fact, for this game, in (67), the coefficient a5 of the quadratic
term vanishes by (76), and this causes the degeneracy.
4.2 Provision of Public Good Games
The Provision of Public Good quadratic game has the form
u1(x, y) = A(x+ y)− Cx−B(x+ y)
2, (80)
u2(x, y) = A(x+ y)− Cy −B(x+ y)
2.
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The Nash equilibria have to satisfy
x∗N + y
∗
N =
A− C
2B
(81)
with utilities
u1(x
∗
N , y) =
(A− C)2
4B
+ Cy, u2(x, y
∗
N ) =
(A− C)2
4B
+ Cx. (82)
For the periodic equilibria, we get
x∗p + y
∗
p =
A
2B
(83)
with utilities
u1(x
∗
p, y) =
A2 − 2AC
4B
+Cy, u2(x, y
∗
p) =
A2 − 2AC
4B
+ Cx. (84)
Thus, the periodic utilities are smaller than the Nash ones, since
u1(x
∗
p, y) = u1(x
∗
N , y)−
C2
4B
, u2(x, y
∗
p) = u2(x, y
∗
N )−
C2
4B
, (85)
unless C = 0. At the periodic equilibrium, the players invest too much, as they ignore
their own costs C. Again, however, this is a special case, because of the symmetry of
the game.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented an intrinsic property of multiplayer, finite, simultaneous, strategic
form games, which we called periodicity of strategies. We studied the periodicity con-
cept in finite action games and proved that every finite action two player strategic form
game has at least one periodic action. Moreover, we proved that the set of periodic
strategies is set stable under the map Q. An action of some player xi is periodic if
the operator Q satisfies Qnixi = xi, where ni is the periodicity number. When mixed
strategies are taken into account, the period length reduces to 1. While those equilibria
are different from the Nash ones, the resulting payoffs for the players are the same, or
in some cases, even higher than the Nash payoffs. Importantly, the periodic mixed
strategy gives outcomes for each player which do not depend on what the opponent
will play, in contrast to the Nash mixed strategy, where when the opponent plays equi-
librium, the own action does not matter. Thus, we have found a solution concept that
in that regard is preferable to the Nash equilibrium. More generally, we have compared
our periodic strategies to the rationalizable strategies of Bernheim [7] and Pearce [8].
Moreover, the application of the algorithm to collective action games gives another
interesting result. We were able to demonstrate that the social optimum strategy can
be played by adopting a non-cooperative thinking.
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Also, the periodic equilibria can be identified by a straightforward algorithm.
The next step would be the inclusion of mixed strategies in multiplayer games. In
that case, the situation will become more complex because the players could form
coalitions. Periodicity then has to be reconsidered under this perspective. Also, one
may wish to study Bayesian games with imperfect information from the perspective of
our periodicity paradigm.
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